The review of the strategy for Afghanistan White House presented Dec. 16 in a year when Obama announced for the first time the starting date of the withdrawal of troops, no big news. If anything, many gaps and omissions in the press and observers have noted since the advances are posted on the New York Times through the five-page summary of the long dossier. Also, just in the same hour, two reports related to the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), then to sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies, put on paper what Obama had preferred to leave out, namely the role of Islamabad and the fragility of the Karzai government. Elements that American intelligence has taken over making it clear that, with a weak and corrupt government in Kabul and no more commitment to Islamabad, very reluctant to apply any American military effort is doomed to failure.
Obama has chosen to show the glass half full: out of Afghanistan, beginning in July 2011 confirmed the withdrawal but leaving with "responsibility" a country where U.S. and NATO are still making progress. Weaken Al Qaeda - said the bid - the Taliban held in check and increase government control the territory, while the Afghan army is growing at rates higher than NATO itself did not include (134mila achieved the goal of soldiers and policemen 109mila on their degree of preparation is well advanced, however, some reservations). But Kate Clark put it, a researcher in Afghanistan Analyst Network (an influential think tank Afghan), Obama has painted a scenario shiny as unreal, "you do not see how it could ensure" peace and stability "in a landscape that has seen in the Kandahar escalate the violence, the failure of the attempt - "trumpeted earlier this year" - to lead the state in Marjah district (Helmand Moshtarak objective of the operation) and the rampant insurgent activity "in both the North and in regions not Pashtun. "
The pitiless analysis of Klark shows at least two things: the first is that there is a considerable discrepancy from what you write relations and the reality on the ground. The second highlights, if ever one were needed, of what the administration is internally divided on what to do in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). A situation complicated by the death of Richard Holbrooke, the negotiator par excellence, for, truth, in recent months had seemed rather shady (perhaps because of an illness that required intervention at the end of more than twenty hours with negative results) obscured in statements and public appearances by Gen. David Petraeus who commands booming since last summer NATO troops and the Americans in Afghanistan.
As far as we know the situation on the ground has worsened. Do not say the only news coverage but at least two files of humanitarian organizations, not least the military - but who prefer to obscure the failures - they have a vision of the situation. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the conditions to carry out its mandate are never so much criticism in recent decades. The ICRC has made a picture in mid-December, which laments the growth of the displaced, the increase in civilian casualties and critical health conditions. Confirming that whole areas of the country, including in the North, are inaccessible to humanitarian action. The month before, 29 Afghan and international aid organizations have signed a document prepared by Oxfam and prepared per il vertice Nato di Lisbona del 19-20 novembre, in cui si mette il dito nella piaga della protezione dei civili afgani. Che non solo รจ disattesa ma che non sembra considerare l'effetto e l'impatto diretto sui civili della nuova terapia muscolare imposta da Petraeus. Secondo il dossier (Nowhere to Turn) gli aerei americani hanno sganciato tra bombe e missili 2100 ordigni solo tra giugno e settembre, con un incremento di circa il 50% rispetto all'anno precedente e con un aumento dell'11% delle vittime civili rispetto all'anno precedente.
Questi numeri (anche se i talebani restano la causa maggiore delle vittime civili) portano dritto alla seconda questione che riguarda l'equivoca strategia dell'Amministrazione americana. If up to the tenure of General McChrystal (Petraeus' predecessor), the military and diplomatic option seemed to run on parallel tracks at least, with the arrival of David, things have changed. If McChrystal had even changed the rules of engagement to avoid an increase in civilian casualties, if you had used the bombing to target more carefully, if he had chosen to always go hand in hand with Karzai and tribal leaders to win with the support of president, Petraeus has reversed course, until his arrival, seemed the same choice by Obama. Convinced, far more than that McChrystal to deal with the Taliban must be done from a position of strength limiting American casualties, Petraeus bombing resumed with greater vigor and without going too subtle. His relations with Karzai and the general are bad does not hide it. Rarely are photographed together and dialogue with tribal leaders chose Petraeus, and imposed on the Afghan government of arming militia groups in villages. The so-called "Iraqi option" so dear to the general as unpopular with many Afghans and European diplomats. The problem is that the results on the ground look the same, even much less, of those established six months ago.
In mid-stream military seems to fumble while also negotiating the option. After the beating of the fake Taliban Mohammed Mansour (a trader in Quetta for a man disguised dome of Omar and billed by 65 thousand dollars for each meeting with Karzai), it became clear to all the peace negotiations, heralded with great fanfare a couple of months ago, everything was but a pious wish. And to listen to Ahmed Rashid, who in a recent article in The New York Review of Books wrote a handbook of how it should be possible to articulate a deal (The Way Out of Afghanistan), the American administration there is no strategy in this regard , waiting, perhaps, that Petraeus on the military get what you can not tack on a political level. If we add boatos insistent that they want Obama, during his recent visit to Bagram for six hours during the night between 3 and 4 December, has not met with Karzai, with whom he met on the phone for 15 minutes, but even Abdullah, or the leader of the opposition to the president and some ministers and former ministers of the Karzai cabinet, the picture looks even more bleak. After resting, discredited and again supported Karzai now is back again in the blender and you would think, in spite of the elections that confirmed him, get him to bow out.
In this framework the "Strategic Policy Review" of the president was not surprised, but fresh water is a bad sign. If even the greatest actor of the conflict has clear ideas, is divided between hawks and doves, negotiators and cowboys, pro and anti-Karzai Karzai, not Wikileaks have to wait to see that the tenth year of the war is likely to pass as it passed the ninth.
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